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SECRET SHARING USING NON-COMMUTATIVE GROUPS AND THE
SHORTLEX ORDER
BREN CAVALLO AND DELARAM KAHROBAEI
ABSTRACT. In this paper we review the Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain secret sharing scheme
[7] and introduce a variation based on the shortlex order on a free group. Drawing inspi-
ration from adjustments to classical schemes, we also present a method that allows for the
protocol to remain secure after multiple secrets are shared.
1. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a cryptographic protocol by which a dealer distributes a secret via
shares to participants such that only certain subsets of participants can together use their
shares to recover the secret. A secret sharing scheme begins with a dealer, a secret, par-
ticipants, and an access structure. The access structure determines which groups of partic-
ipants have access to the secret. The goal of the scheme is to distribute the secret to the
participants in such a way that only sets of participants within the access structure have
access to the secret. In this way, it is most often the case that no individual participant can
recover the secret on their own.
Secret sharing schemes are ideal tools for when the secret is both highly important and
highly sensitive. The fact that there are multiple shares, as opposed to one private key
in private key cryptography, makes the secret less likely to be lost while allowing high
levels of confidentiality. If any one share is compromised the secret can generally still be
recovered with the non-compromised shares. Additionally, even though the secret is spread
out over multiple shares, recovering the secret is limited by the access structure, and so the
secret remains secure. Secret sharing has applications in multi-party encryption, Byzantine
agreement, and threshold encryption among others. See [1] for a survey on secret sharing
and its applications in cryptography and computer science.
2. FORMAL DEFINITION
A secret sharing scheme consists of a dealer, n participants, P1, . . . Pn, and an access
structure A ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} such that for all A ∈ A and A ⊆ B, B ∈ A. To share a secret
s, the dealer runs an algorithm:
Share(s) = (s1, · · · , sn)
and then distributes each share si to Pi. In order to recover the secret, participants can run
the algorithm Recover which has the property that for all A ∈ A:
Recover({si : i ∈ A}) = s
1
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and if A /∈ A then running Recover is either computationally infeasible or impossible. As
such, only groups of participants in A can access the secret. The monotonicity of A is also
apparent in that if A ∈ A and A ⊆ B then the set of participants in A could also recover
the secret for B. A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if ∀A /∈ A the shares si ∈ A
together give no information about s.
3. SHAMIR’S SECRET SHARING SCHEME
One of the more common access structures one sees in secret sharing is the (k,n) threshold:
A = {A ∈ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} : |A| ≥ k}
Namely, A consists of all subsets of the n participants of size k or greater. We call a secret
sharing scheme that has A as a (k, n) threshold a (k,n) threshold scheme. The problem of
discovering a perfect (k, n) threshold scheme was solved independently by G. Blakely [2]
and A. Shamir [15] in 1979.
In the Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme, the secret is an element in Zp where p is a prime
number larger than the number of participants. Given a secret s, the dealer generates the
shares for a (k, n) threshold by doing the following:
• The dealer randomly selects a1, · · · , ak−1 ∈ Zp such that ak−1 6= 0 and con-
structs the polynomial f(x) = ak−1xk−1 + · · ·+ a1x+ s
• For each participant Pi the dealer publishes a corresponding xi ∈ Zp. The dealer
then distributes the share si = f(xi) to each Pi over a private channel.
Any subset of k participants can then reconstruct the polynomial f(x) by using polynomial
interpolation and then finding f(0) = s. This method finds s uniquely as any degree k− 1
polynomial is uniquely determined by the k shares. The shares are consistent because each
(xi, f(xi)) is a point on the polynomial f(x) and thus any k shares will reconstruct the
same polynomial. In order to reconstruct a polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x + · · ·ak−1xk−1
given points (x1, f(x1)), · · · , (xk, f(xk)) one can solve for the coefficients column in the
following system of linear equations:


x1
k−1 · · · x1 1
x2
k−1 · · · x2 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
xk
k−1 · · · xk 1




ak−1
ak−2
.
.
.
a0

 =


f(x1)
f(x2)
.
.
.
f(xk)


The above method of interpolation demonstrates that Shamir’s scheme is perfect. If there
were less than k shares, than the system of equations above would have more equations
than unknowns, and there would not be a unique solution for a0.
4. SECRET SHARING USING NON-COMMUTATIVE GROUPS
Given a set of letters X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} we define the free group generated by X ,
F (X), as the set of reduced words in the alphabet X±1 = {x±1
1
, . . . , x±1n }, where a word
is reduced if there are no subwords of the form x−1i xi or xix
−1
i . Given a set of words
R ⊂ F (X) we define 〈〈R〉〉 as the smallest normal subgroup of F (X) containing R and
define the group G = 〈X |R〉 = F (X)/〈〈R〉〉. We call R the set of relators of G.
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A group G = 〈X |R〉 has a solvable word problem if there exists an algorithm to de-
termine if any word w ∈ G is trivial. Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (HKS) secret sharing
[7] uses a group with an efficiently solvable word problem to create an (n, n) threshold
scheme which can be extended to a (k, n) threshold scheme using the method of Shamir.
4.1. (n, n) Threshold. In this case the secret, s, is an element of {0, 1}k which we view as
a column vector. The setting is initialized by making a set of generatorsX = {x1, · · · , xn}
public. To distribute the shares the dealer does the following:
• Distributes to each Pi over a private channel a set of wordsRi in the alphabetX±1
that define the group Gi = 〈X |Ri〉.
• Randomly generates the shares si ∈ {0, 1}k for i = 1, · · · , n − 1 and sn =
s−
∑n−1
j=0 sj where the addition is bitwise addition in Fk2 .
• Publishes words wji over the alphabet X±1 such that a word wji is trivial in Gi if
sji = 1 and non-trivial if sji = 0.
Since the Gi have efficiently solvable word problem, the participant Pk can determine
which of the wjk are trivial or non-trivial and can independently recover sk. To recover the
secret, the Pi add the si and find s. Note that even though the wji are sent over an open
channel, the shares remain secure since the Ri are private. Therefore no other participant
can recover si from the wji since only Pi knows Gi.
4.2. (k, n) Threshold. One can extend the above scheme to a (k, n) threshold via Shamir’s
scheme. As is the case with Shamir’s scheme, the secret s is an element of Zp and the
shares, si, correspond to points on a polynomial of degree k− 1 with constant term s. The
shares are distributed and reconstructed in an identical manner as above by viewing the
si in their binary form. The trivial and non-trivial words are sent to each Pi so that they
reconstruct each si in its binary form. After recovering their shares any element of the
access structure can use polynomial interpolation to find s:
• The dealer randomly selects a1, · · · , ak−1 ∈ Zp such that ak−1 6= 0 and con-
structs the polynomial f(x) = ak−1xk−1 + · · ·+ a1x+ s.
• For each participant Pi the dealer publishes a corresponding xi ∈ Zp. The dealer
then converts each si = f(xi) into binary. And thus, each si can be viewed as a
column vector of length l = ⌊log
2
p⌋+ 1.
• As was the case in the (n, n) scheme, the dealer distributes the si over an open
channel by sending each Pi the words w1i, · · · , wli over the alphabet X± such
that wji is trivial in Gi if sji = 1 and non-trivial if sji = 0.
• The participants reconstruct their own si and can recover the secret using polyno-
mial interpolation.
Some advantages this secret sharing scheme has over Shamir’s scheme include the fact
that after the Ri are distributed, one can still use them to send out and reconstruct more
secrets rather than having to privately distribute new shares each time a different secret is
picked. Private information has to only be sent once initially for an arbitrary amount of
secrets to be shared due to the method of distributing the shares. Despite this, the scheme is
vulnerable to an adversary determining the relators by seeing patterns in words they learn
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are trivial. Namely, after a participant reveals their share (possibly while recovering the
secret) an adversary could determine which of the wji were trivial and potentially find the
group presentation of Gi which would allow them to reconstruct Pi’s share on their own.
As in [7], we assume that this is a computationally difficult problem. Moreover, in Section
5 we provide a method to update relators over time thus limiting the amount of information
an adversary could obtain about a single group. Another advantage to this scheme is that
since it is based on the Shamir secret sharing protocol it can benefit from the large amount
of research done on Shamir’s scheme. For instance, the verification methods or proactive
secret sharing protocols from [16] and [8] can still be used in this scheme.
4.3. Small Cancellation Groups. In this section we introduce a candidate group for the
above secret sharing scheme.
A word w is cyclically reduced if it is reduced in all of its cyclic permutations. Note
that this only occurs if the word is freely reduced, it has no subwords of the form x−1i xi or
xix
−1
i , and the first and last letters are not inverses of each other.
A set of words R is called symmetrized if each word is cyclically reduced and the entire
set and their inverses are closed under cyclic permutation. If R is viewed as a set of
relators, symmetrizingR does not change the resulting group as the closure R under cyclic
permutations and inverses is a subset of the normal closure.
Given a set R we say that v is a piece if it is a maximal initial subword of two different
words, namely if there exist w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 = vr1 and w2 = vr2. A group
G = 〈X |R〉 satisfies the small cancellation condition C′(λ) for 0 < λ < 1 if for all r ∈ R
such that r = vw where v is a piece, then |v| < λ|r|.
Small cancellation groups satisfying C′(1
6
) have a linear time algorithm for the word
problem [3] making them an ideal candidate for the HKS secret sharing scheme. Moreover,
it can be seen from their definition that if the number of generators is large compared
to the number of relators and lengths of the relators, it is likely that there will be small
cancellation since the probability that any two words have a large maximal initial segment
is low. After generating a random set of relators satisfying the above properties, it is also
fast to symmetrize the set and then find the pieces and check that they are no larger than
one sixth of the word. As such, it is fast to create such groups by repeatedly randomly
generating relators, symmetrizing, and checking to see if they satisfy the C′(1
6
) condition.
There are other groups that have an efficient word problem that could also function as
candidate groups, but small cancellation groups have the advantage of being efficient to
generate randomly.
4.4. Secret Sharing and the Shortlex Ordering. Let X = {x1, · · · , xn} and G = 〈X〉.
A shortlex ordering on G is induced by an order on X±1 as follows. Given reduced w =
xi1 · · ·xip and l = xj1 · · ·xjk with w 6= l then w < l if and only if:
• |w| < |l|
• or if p = k and xia < xja where a = minα{xiα 6= xjα}
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For example, let X = {x, y} and give X± the ordering x < x−1 < y < y−1. Then some
of the first words in order would be:
e < x < x−1 < y < y−1 < x2 < xy < xy−1 < x−2 < x−1y < x−1y−1 < yx <
yx−1 < y2 < y−1x < y−1x−1 < y−2 < x3 < x2y < x2y−1 < xyx < xyx−1 < · · ·
Utilizing the the shortlex ordering, we can modify the HKS (k, n) threshold as follows:
• The dealer publishes the letters X and over a private channel sends a set of words,
Ri inX±1 to each Pi such thatGi = 〈X |Ri〉 is a group with an efficient algorithm
to reduce words with respect to the Ri or compute normal forms.
• The dealer chooses a secret s ∈ Zp for some large prime p > n and generates a
random polynomial, f in Zp[x] with constant term s
• The dealer assigns a public xi ∈ Zp to each participant, computes f(xi), and
finds si ∈ F (X) such that si is the f(xi)th word in F (X). Note that xi is not a
generator of G, but rather the x-coordinate associated to each participant’s share.
• The dealer publishes a word wi that reduces to si in Gi. This can be done ef-
ficiently by interspersing conjugated products of relators between the letters of
si.
• Each participant Pi computes their share by reducing wi to get si and then com-
puting its position in F (X).
• Using their shares they find the secret using polynomial interpolation.
The main advantage of this new method is that participants need only reduce one word
rather than a number of words corresponding to the length of the secret. In general, being
able to reduce words is more general than being able to solve the word problem in a finitely
presented group and in some cases may be more complex. It is important to note the
following about this scheme:
• Given an algorithm that reduces words, each wi must reduce uniquely to si. This
implies that if our reduction algorithm does not terminate at si, then it is not a
viable share for this scheme. In that case, if a random f(xi) does not correspond
to a fully reduced word or a word in normal form, the dealer can always assign Pi
a different xi. It may also be necessary to check that each wi reduces to si give
the reduction algorithm before the shares are distributed.
• Some reduction algorithms can be done in multiple ways given the same initial
conditions and can terminate at different words. As such, it is important to fix a
protocol so that whatever process Pi uses to reduce wi terminates at si.
4.5. Platform Group. For this variant of the HKS secret sharing scheme, we also propose
C′(1
6
) groups. Additionally, we propose the parameters |X | = 40, |R| = 4, and |r| = 9
for all r ∈ R. We find that with such parameters, generating a single C′(1
6
) group can be
done in roughly 1 second in GAP [6] by generating random relators of the given length and
then checking that the set of relators satisfies the small cancellation condition. In order to
reduce the wi to si, participants can use Dehn’s algorithm which terminates in linear time
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[3]. It is not guaranteed in general that Dehn’s algorithm will reduce each wi to si, as such
it is necessary to check that each wi reduces to si. In order to test the efficacy of Dehn’s
algorithm in C′(1
6
) groups for the purposes of this secret sharing scheme, we performed
the following tests in GAP [6]:
• Generate 10 small cancellation groups using the parameters from the first para-
graph of this section.
• In each group we generated 100 words of length less than 10 and created corre-
sponding large unreduced words of length 500 by inserting conjugated products
of relators between letters in our original word.
• Applied an implementation of Dehn’s algorithm due to Chris Staecker [17] and
checked that our unreduced word successfully reduced to the original word.
After running said tests, we found that Dehn’s algorithm successfully reduced every word.
The size considerations in the second item were given in part because there are enough
non-trivial, Dehn reduced, words of length 10 or less in the free group on 40 generators to
be used as shares in a practical setting.
4.6. Efficiency. Each step in modified HKS scheme can be done efficiently. As mentioned
previously, generating C′(1
6
) groups can be done quickly by repeatedly generating sets of
relators and checking to see if they satisfy the necessary small cancellation condition. The
necessary computations using the shortlex ordering can be done using basic combinatorial
formulas that are very fast for a computer to evaluate. Additionally, the wi can be created
efficiently from the si by inserting conjugated products of relators and then reduced in
polynomial time using Dehn’s algorithm. Moreover, the dealer can also check that the wi
reduce to the si efficiently. Hence each additional step to the standard Shamir’s scheme
can be done efficiently. This is also an improvement over the standard HKS scheme since
the amount of words that need to be reduced is independent of the length of the secret,
making it possible for larger secrets to be distributed efficiently.
5. UPDATING RELATORS
The main security concern for this cryptoscheme is the possibility of an adversary dis-
covering a participant’s set of relators. This can either be done using information gained
from combining shares, but even potentially just from the public wi. As more secrets are
shared, the original set of relators becomes less secure. Moreover, information may be
discovered either by breaking into wherever a participant stores their relators or if partial
information was discovered during the initial step. In this section we present a method to
refresh a participant’s relator set using the same inherent security assumptions necessary
for the cryptoscheme, namely that at least one round of secret sharing is secure. To do this
we add steps that can take place before any new secret is sent out:
• For each Pi the dealer creates a set of words, R′i, in X±1 such that Gi = 〈X |R′i〉
satisfies the same desired properties.
• In order to distribute each r ∈ R′i, the dealer pads r with relators in Ri as done
previously and publishes them.
• Pi then reduces r by using the relators in Ri.
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• After the full set of words in R′i is published and reduced, Pi deletes the original
Ri and sets Ri := R′i.
If these steps are done before an adversary can gain adequate information about relators,
then after an update phase the information an adversary has gained will be largely rendered
useless. Also note that a single secret can be kept secure over a long period of time using
the methods in [8]. In this case, it is important that the words in R′i are reduced with
respect to the original Ri. As such, Ri and R′i are not completely unrelated, but as the
relators become updated each additional time, they will have less and less to do with the
original set of relators.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a modification of the HKS secret sharing scheme using the
shortlex ordering on free groups. It improves the original scheme by removing the relation
of the number of times each participant has to solve the word problem to the length of the
secret. As such, larger secrets can be shared efficiently and the overall scheme is more
efficient. Moreover, it shares the advantage over Shamir’s scheme that multiple secrets can
be shared given the same initial private information. We also introduce a method to update
relators so that the scheme remains secure when arbitrarily many secrets are shared and
that does not involve more private information being distributed.
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